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ABSTRACT
This thesis represents an initial effort to define the characteristics of a command,
control, and communications (0) architecture. It provides a basic understanding of the
command and control process, command, control and communications architecture, and
command, contiol and communications system analyzed from the point of view of an
information system. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to introduce the basic concepts
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Military commanders throughout history have faced the problem of controlling their
forces for decisive application of military power. [Ref 1: p. 9] Their objective is to con-
trol a particular area of land through imposing their will against the enemy. In order to
achieve this objective, the commander needs information, -both before the actions and
while the actions are taking place. Command and control (0 ) provide the appropriate
tools to attain this objective. Success in battle cannot be attained without Q.
The existence of C as a fundamental piece of the contributing elements of battle is
not a revelation. Military history is replete with examples that demonstrate this point.
In the Second Macedonian War, the Roman Army under Titus Flamunius, brought
King Philiph V from Macedonia -to bay at the battle of Cynosephalae in 197 B.C. The
opposing armies were roughly equal in numbers. The Romans fought in maniples or-
ganized-in -groups of about a hundred men, each with his own-commander and capable-
of flexible movement and control. The Macedonians employed the phalanx --an un-
wieldy solid line of' troops armed- with 20-foot pikes and almost impossible to control
or maneuver because of its length and rigid formation. -Philip attacked the Roman
maniples with 32 phalanxes, planning to overwhelm them with the sheer mass of his
force. The-front phalanx broke around-the maniples as theywere pressed forward by the
ranks following them. They lost all cohesion and order, and the small disciplined
maniples with their short thrusting-swords decimated them. The Romans lost about 700-
men. The Macedonians suffered 80,000 killed and 5,000 captured. There were, of course,
many factors contributing to Flaminius' overwhehning victory, but one of the most im-
portant was the execution of the commander's control over small and maneuerable
forces. [Ref. 2: p. 16]
Another more recent example-is the German victory over a vastly superior Russian
force during the Battle of Tannenburg in 1914. The ermans addcd radio and cable
communications as well as cormnunications security to their C systems in this case. The
German High Command adapted the communications -procedures to be employed in
battle to its standard process of command and control. Tannenburg is known as the
Cannae of modern times because of the superior use of military tactics and doctrine in
this battle. This was largely possible through the effective use of communications by
German forces which permitted flexible and responsive command and control (C ). The
Russians, on the other hand, were often immobilized by lack of communication and
could not swing their forces to exploit tactical advantages on the battlefield.[Ref. 3: p.
34]
These are notorious examples where C2 was decisive in managing the battle, but in
fact in every battle, command and control play a fundamental role. Recently the tech-
nological revolution has -brought many changes in human activities including the art of
waging war. Electronic technology in its many forms of transmission, processing, col-
lation, distribution and analysis was the catalyst which precipitated-what is known as the
discipline of 0 . But C2 is much more than just the materials and- elements necessary to
handle information (hardware and sotfware). It includes both the-people who make the
decisions and those who-operate and maintain the systems. In a- very real sense, C2 en-
compasses the management of information that can make -a difference to a decision
maker.
B. PURPOSE
The process involved -in combat operations which optimize the -performance of
friendl) forces and -the-information system aichitecture which supports -those operations
will be described in- some -detail in this thesis. The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to
help the development -efforts of the Argentine Army in designing a -0 architecture
through the presentation -of the basic concepts of command and control processes and
command, control, and communications s, stems. This is only a- suggested guide to the
main aspects related to C and 0 to be presented to an army whose current doctrine
does not contain those-concepts. This is an attempt to put together -related facts found
in the military literature-with the objective of helping the people who are now working
on the C2 area in the Argentine Army.
C. ORGANIZATION AND-SCOPE
This thesis can be-divided into three parts. The first part -includes Chapters II, IlI
and IV. This part introduces the definiiions and processes of C. Chapter II gives a series
of the current definitions of C2 , 0 , C I and other terms that military use has made
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popular. The different models or perceptions that bound C2 are also presented in this
chapter. Chapter III introduces the basic concepts of C2 , its purposes and the means
used in its implementation. The models, from the basic approach to more complex or-
ganizations, are introduced in a systematic way. Chapter IV introduces the cumbat
models developed for the execution of the command and control of engagc military
forces. Human and psychological aspects are taken into account in this approach, par-
ticularly in the decision making activities.
The second part includes Chapters V and VI, and it is designed to broadly describe
the combat information system architecture and give an idea of the state of the
Argentine Army 0 project. Chapter V reviews the architecture at different levels of the
whole information system that supports the army's activities, from the strategic or the-
ater level to the tactical level. Some aspects of the Air Land Battle related to C are also
introduced in this chapter. Chapter VI describes the current-state of the Argentine Army
C project, the steps to take to reach the objective, and the probable evolution of-the -
project. Finally, Chapter VII gives -the conclusion of this thesis.
II. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL (C-)
A. INTRODUCTION
The concept of command and control (C) has long been used in various aspects
related to military forces. C is one of the most used and abused term in the military lit-
erature. It has been used to mean everything from military computers to the art of con-
ducting military operations. In the last few years, C1 has been symbolized by many
terms, such as: C, C1 I, C4 , and C4 I. [Ref. 1: p. 13)
B. DEFINITIONS
I. Department of Defense (DOD).
The different terms mentioned above are not easy to define. A good starting
point is the-official US Department of Defense (DOD) definition forC0-:
The exercise of athority and direction-by a properly designated commander oxer
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the-mission. Command and control func-
tions are -performed through an arrangement of' personnel, equipment, communi-
cations, facilities, and procedures which-are employed by a commander-in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the-accomplishment
of the rission.
This definition can be seen as containing three different definitions. "The exer-
cise of authorit3 and direction b a properly designated commander over assigned forces
in the accomplishment of the mission" is the definition of command. "An arrangement
of personnel, -equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures which are emplo3ed
by a commander" is the definition of C3 -system, and the expression- -"employed by a
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations
in the accomplishment of the mission" is the -definition of command and control. Each
of the three parts in which the original DOD definition has been divided is a specific
entity and will-be -explained in detail in this-chapter.
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2. Robert E. Conley.
To clarify the concept of command and control, the definition given by Robert
E. Conley helps [Ref. 4: p. 15]:
Command and control (C) is a process of resource allocation (management) by a
knowledgeable, recognized point of authority to accomplish a given objective(s).
This definition is useful because it is brief and broad enough to be confidently
applied. This definition also is coincident with the natural perception of the idea of
command and control -in the military world: a process by which a military objective is
accomplished with the resources available by an officer in a military command position.
The general nature of the definition, however, applies to other management areas and
is not limited to the military. The contribution of this definition to the understanding
of C is that it introduces the term "process," -which is the key word in the C1 concept.
C. MODELS AND PERCEPTIONS
Although, in general there is agreement that new technologies have an impact on
C1, -there are many different opinions about what is really new and revolutionary in
battle support systems. Such different opinions give rise to various models of C and
C. Based on common aspects of these views, K. L. Moll defines -three models which he
calls "perceptions." [Ref. 5: p. 23]
1. The electronic perception.
Most people perceive C1 as a collection of electronic hardware and computer
software. Although this is a simple and -primitive view, it is a -natural organizational
procedure. The electronic perception makes little distinction between C, and C.
2. The mirror perception.
Many observers of C al-d C1 perceive-them to be a mirror of their own interests
and activities. From this -point of view, the classical definition of C2 is a mirror percep-
tion of the command function. Commanders and military historians often associate C
with the organization-of channels of command over some particular forces. In this case,
they rarely distinguish between C1 and C1 . Communicators often-see C2 as a reflection
of communications. Communicators provided the main resource for planning and
maintaining the earls C, s3stems. The concept that "combat operitions ne~er could be
a complished without command and control coordinated through specialized Lommuni-
cations"[Ref. 6: p. 11] may account for the origins of C3 s3 stems. Computer technicians
sometimes see C2 as nirroring automation, making the computer like the heart, a really
key component of the sy stem. The term C4 appears to ensure that computers, like
communications , are given separate recognition.
3. Process perception.
Earlier, C was defined as a process, or more specifically "a process of allocation
of resources, b a knowledgeable recognized point of authority to accomplish a gi en
objective," [Ref. 4: p. 151. However, frequently C is visualized as a "management in-
formation system" with feedback loops and other elements of cybernetics, control, and
decision theory.
The process perception provides the basis for the definition of C given by the
Strategic Air Command (SAC):
An information handling process which provides an inward flow of data to the de-
cision making lexel and the subsequent outx'ard flow of directixes to subordinate
leels of command. It is not a decision making process in itself, but rather a com-
bination of the means through which the fators that shape decisions are funneled
to appropriate conunand lexels and the xehicle through which a commander dis-
seminates directixes to complement these decisions. It is cyclical in its nature...IRef.
7: p. 46]
Comparing the three perception models gixen by Moll to the process perception,
it can be said that the latter is closer to what command and control really is. Funda-
mentallx. C is a process. Electronic hardware and computers gixe physical support to
the closed loop nature of the process.
D. THE C SYSTEM
Recall~ng the point that C is a process, it follows that a C system is one which
supports that process. In general. a C system can be considered as a collection of peo-
ple. procedures, and equipment which allows a commander to sense, compare, decide,
and act. [Ref. 1: p. 18] The meaning of these terms will be explained in detail in Chapter
Il. Ilowexer, those terms are implicit in the dcfinition issued b5 Dr. Gerald P. Dinneen
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(Former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communication, Command, Control, and In-
telligence)):
The C0 systems of the DOD are the means by which our military commanders, under
the direction of the president as the commander-in-chief, employ the military
strength of our nation. Reliable conimunications. information processing, surveil-
lance and warning, electronic warfare and counter-C3 are essential for effective C0.
[Ref. 8: p. 101
Another definition for a C system focuses on the characteristics of systematization.
Systemizing shows the characteristics of assemblage of objects united b some form of
regular interaction or interdependence:
The command, control, and communications system is a collection of elements
which display the properties of the command and control process. [Ref. 5: p. 25]
From the point of view of a system, C2 can be seen as a set of different parts, whose re-
lationships and interactions work synergistically to accomplish an objectixe. The system
is embedded in the environment in which command and control must operate.
In other words, it is the purpose of a C1 system to observe and provide warning and
assessment of the intentions of adversaries, to collect and process information on the
status of friendly and hostile forces, to support operational planning and decision mak-
ing, and to communicate conmmands to forces. Although the concept of systematization
has been introduced through the utilization of the command and control concept, it is
important to emphasize that in many cases the term (2 system is utilized in place of C(
system. However, the rest of this thesis will employ the term C2 for the process and C(
for the system.
A more simplified approach to explaining a C3 system is to draw an analogy between
it and the human body system:
Stimuli are received through the body's sensors (eyes, ears, nose, fingers, etc.) and
the nervous system transmits this data to the brain, which interprets this data into
information and makes decisions. Then the commands to take actions are relayed
via the nervous system, from the brain to the limbs. Thus sensors such az radars
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send information over communication systems to the command center (brain) where
commanders make decisions and disseminate the decision back (over the ner% ous
system) to the combat forces (the hands, the fists, the punch). The s3 stem of C must
be kept in balance to haNe an effectixe fighting force, just as the living system must
stay in balance to function properly. [Ref. 9: p. 33]
E. OTHER TERMS
An aggregation of related elements gives rise to a C shorthand that is sometimes
o~erused in the military literature. The reasoning that follows shows the evolution of
these terms. the need for communication systems for connecting the commander with
his forces and to his sources of data results in creating C systems. The need of the
commander and his staff for staying informed about the enemy results in the C 1 s3stem
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence system). The need for informa-
tion processing to store, process, and manipulate data results in the CI system (Com-
mand, Control, Conununications, Computers, and Intelligence system). The need for
command flcilitics or fusion centers where esscntial information can be assembled, in-
tegrated, and displayed to provide the commander the ready means for his planning,
executing, coordinating and controlling results in the C6 system (Command, Control,
Coimmunications, Computers, Command Center, and Intelligence system). The need for
interoperabilitN at levels of command results in the C6P system (Command, Control,
Conunnications, Computers, Conunand Center, Intelligence and Interoperabilty s~s-
tern). And finall%, the need for position and location s stems and identification s. stems
in order to keep the comnander informed and provided with a clear and accurate per-
ception of his cnxironment results in the C'I 2PLRS (Command, Control, Communi-
cations, Computers, Command Center, Intelligence, Interoperability, and Position
Location Reporting System). and so on to CIm. [Ref. 10: p. 6]
The seemingly limitless combinations of "Cs" and "Is" do not provide an exhaustive
list of all elements that must be considered when examining C1 functions. There are other
terms like C CM ( C1 Countermeasures ) approved by the DOD, which means the use
of both lethal and non-lethal capabilities for attacking the enemy's C structure, while
protecting one's own. Others prefer the term C1 W (C Warfare) instead of C1 CM in
order to a% oid a "reacti% e" connotation to the term countermeasure, preferring the other
more "proactive" term of warfare.
8
F. SUMMARY
This chapter is designed to introduce several definitions of command and control, and
command, control and communication systems. Some models or perceptions have been
preqented in order to understand the particular points of view of recognized professionals
in the C0 community. Finally, it was shown how the aggregation of terms have giN en rise
to a lot of acronyms which are often used in the C literature.
As a conclusion, it can be said that command and control is fundamentally a proc-
ess. A dynamic feedback characterizes this process. The physical elements supporting the
process in a coordinated manner described the comnand, control and communication
system. However. in many cases, the terms C" system and C system are used inter-
changeably.
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III. THE C PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The last chapter introduced the basic definitions and concepts of C2. As was said
before, C --in simplest terms-- is a process: the process by which a commander exercises
authority and direction o er assigned forces in the accomplishment of his mission. The
functions inxolxed in this process and the means that support the process will be ex-
plained in this chapter.
B. THE C0 PROCESS AND ITS PURPOSE
The "paramount decision" is the decision to engage the enemy (or if engaged, to
disengage) Nflhich relates to the deploxment and motion of resources and assets assigned
to the human military commander to carrx out a mission specified by higher authoritN.
Thus, C can be described as a process which allocates resources.
A model of the C process will be presented, discussing in detail its principal func-
tions. Conceptual models will be constructed from pre iousl3 developed concepts. The
models presented in this paper are attributed to Dr Joel S. Lawson, Sr, from the Nasal
Electronic S3 stems Command, and are taken from his report entitled: "The State Vari-
ables of a Coimand and Control System." [Ref. 11: p. 611
These models emphasize the process perception of cormmand and control. t proc-
ess, in broad terms, can be defined as a method of doing something with all the steps
involved [Ref. 12: p. 131]. Considering C as a process leads naturally to the question
ofx hat is the output of that process? Quite clearly, in the eyes of the political leadership
of a countr3, the purpose of its armed forces is to provide the means --hopefully of last
resort-- to establish or maintain control oer some geographic area [Ref. 1: p. 17]. Thus,
we might define the purpose of a command and control process as follows: "The pur-
pose of the command control process is to either maintain or change the equilibrium
state of the environment, as determined by a higher authority" [Ref. 13: pp. 71-76].
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In keeping with this definition, it can be said that the purpose of C2 is controlling
the environment in which the commander and his forces are embedded. The concept
of "controlling the environment" brings inmediately the idea that the command and
control process should be a feedback process to be able of accomplish its purpose.
C. THE MEANS







* Forces To Command
e A Commander
The first five elements are traditionally considered in the C system. In this case, two
more elements are added: the forces to accomplish the mission and the commander.
For the 2 process to function, there must be a single will directing --at least in a
macro sense-- the activities of the forces. Therefore, there must be a commander. Sec-
ondly, the commander cannot control the environment by himself' His forces must be
considered as part of his C' system because they provide the means for him to "control"
the environment around him. [Ref. 11: p. 62]
A particular remark should be made regarding sensor systems. According to Gen-
eral Robert T. Herres, U.S.A.F., former Commander, U.S. Space Command, sensor
systems are either an integral part of a comnand and control process or are in direct
support of that process. Their categorization depends on their functional application at
the time of their use and their role relative to the commander's mission [Ref. 14: p. 413J.
However, in an elemental manner, sensors gixe information about the enemy and the







* Acoustic and thermal detection means
Others will give information about the interior of the enemy's position. They are:
* Ground stations
* Mobile platform stations
* Space stations
Communications link the kind of systems mentioned above with the command post,
and connect the conmmand post with others and with the supported units, The links will
maintain contact through:
* Wire and cables
* Electromagnetic waves
* Optic fiber, etc
On the tactical level, the C' process will-use HF, VHF and UHF transmissions. Ul-
timately, lasurs and optical fibers have been applied successfully as transinission medi-
ums.
The commander and his staff will use-the data processing means to-treat the infor-
mation they hae receixed and the data that they have stored during peacetime. These
means include the- hardware: computers, screens, videos, TVs, printers, plotters, etc, and
the software-needed to support the process.
The harmonious functioning of the means mentioned above presents:information in
a crude way. Therefore it is necessary to transform this crude information into intelli-
gence. It is here M;here information managemcnt actions intervene to transform the raw
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data into useful and coherent information and to orient and coordinate the search for
new data. Finally, the decision aids ghe the commander and his staff an adequate means
to evaluate the situations and help the commander in adopting the proper problem re-
solution.
D. THE 0 PROCESS MODEL
In keeping with our pre~ious discussion, a convenient model of the 0 process can
be derixed by considering it to be a cybernetic system which is attempting to control the
environment around it. Such a system is shown in Figure 1. [Ref. 11: p. 641 This is the
basic 0 process model, and it is presented here to clarify the initial stage in the devel-







Figure 1. Basic Model of C Process
13
Basically, the process starts with a sensing of the environment. This is followed by
a comparison of the resulting perception of the environment with some "desired state"
of that environli..;nt, generally established by higher authority. Based on this compar-
ison, decisions are made and actions initiated to bring the environment into closer con-
formance to the "desired state."[Ref. 11: p. 621 This is a feedback process where the
output of the ACT function impacts on the environment and orients the SENSE func-
tion.
.wson's detailed model of the C process is shown in Figure 2. [Ref. 11: p. 65]
There are five basic functions indicated, together with their interfaces with the environ-
ment. The SENSE function inN olves all systems and procedures used to gather data from
the environment.
E n viro nme nt I ore Freds.' J
Dede ]D-es ion A Ids
Act to higher authority--.-
igure-I ., ,-iled Model of a C2 Process
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These include different types of sensors, some of which are active (radar, potentially la-
ser), and others which are passive based on physical phenomena (optical, infrared,
electromagnetic, etc). The goal of the seasors is to provide concinuous coverage of the
en,ironment under all conditions. External data, not directly from the environment, may
be used.
The PROCESS function involves all the processes and procedures used to deduce
the occurrence of specific significant events or situations from the data gathered from
the environment. This function produces event reports and status reports for use by later
functions.
The COMPARE function compares the state of the environment, as determined by
reports from the process function, with a desired state as specified by some external
source. Based upon this comparison and with the help of decision aids, the DECIDE
function determines what should be done to move the actual state to the desired state,
and the ACT function executes that decision. Therefore, the ACT function involves the
interface between the system being controlled by the-commander or decision maker and
the environment. It is the means used to force or influence changes in the environment
that are determined to be desirable. The result of acting may produce a change in the
environment, which is again sensed, and the entire-process is repeated.
This simple model leads directly to the concept of "nesting" such command and
control processes, one wit),in another, as illustrated in Figure 3 on page 16. [Ref. 13:
pp. 71-76] This is spoken of as a hierarchical structure or the chain of command. The
concept of nesting is more descriptive because it emphasizes the interaction- of different
levels of command at both the "beginning" of the process (sensing of the environment)
and the end of the process (the issuing of orders and status reports.)
That is, the superior and subordinate processes go on in parallel, with the major
distinguishing feature being the size of the environment they deal with. Presumably the
superior process, having a larger environment, will not deal with the same level of detail
that the subordinate does. This, of course , may be -not true in the case of crisis man-
agement, when the highest levels in the C" process may have to deal in great detail with





Figure 3." "Nested" 0 Process
This nested model could be enriched by the existence of more than one subordinate
under one superior. This model represents a more complex presentation of the process,
but also a more realistic and believeable process, such as is possible in the -real world,
as stated in the following quotation:
Participation of several subordinate acti itics could be reflected, with each of their
enirowiinents iilIudCd (pussibly Mith O idp), in the enmironment of the senior au-
thority. Such a representation could be useftl in highlighting the real need for co-
operating elements.to coordinate their dctions. [Ref. 15: p. 6]
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Il
Figure 4 describes this situation. [Ref. 13: pp. 71-76] It should be pointed out on







Figure 4. Coordination of the Q Process
Therefore, there will be an overlap of the responsibility zones. In this case, it is imposed
by the need of the existence of close coordination between the superior and his subor-
dinates. The role of the conunander is, in such a case, to monitor and control the inter-
ffce between his subordinates as their common superior.
The process introduced so far appears very much like an "intelligence process," but
the outstanding difference is the fact that the intelligence process does not care about
the desired state. It'attempts to predict the fluture based on both past facts and the
present -tate of the environment. This process goes on in parallel with the C process,
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but there are several differences that obligate the commander to be careful in the treat-
ment of the interfaces between both processes.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter is designed to establish a commonly understood definition and de-
scription of the C2 process. The purpose of the l ocess has been introduced along with
the means to support the process. Figure 1 on page 13 depicts the process in a very
simplified form shoN ing the most important characteristics in order to allow a discussion
of the architectural featLres. The detailed model permits observation of the interactions
with the external world. This leads directly to the concept of nesting of one C2 process
within another C process. Finally, the coordinated process is shown in a model which
is closer to reality than the previous models introduced thus far.
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IV. THE COMBAT OPERATIONS MODELS OF C-
A, INTRODUCTION
The last chapter introduced the main characteristics of the C2 process and showed
its purpose and the means it uses to reach its goals. Also introduced were different
models of this process. As a continuation of the information previously explained, this
chapter "ill develop the C process and its application to military operations through the
combat operations process model. The intelligence analysis task, inherent to this process,
will be developed it some detail.
B. THE LAWSON Q I PROCESS MODEL
The basic cormnand and control model, developed by Lawson and introduced in the
previous chapter, is expanded to take the intellegence function into consideration. It is
shown in Figure 5 on page 20. [Ref. 16: p. 2611t can be seen that the right side of the
model conforms to what was developed in the previous chapter. The left side is what is
new in this model and is called zone I (intelligence zone).
In the SENSE function, the data received from any level of command are analyzed
to see what the enemy is doing and what it is trying to do. This data comes from the
environment through the sensors once the action is in progress, hence these systems are
for combat situations.
The PROCESS function determines the options that the enemy has available to him
to carry out his intentions. Because there is insufficient data to specifically identify which
option the enemy will choose, this function will tell the previous function "what" and
"where" to sense. The COMPARE function analyzes the new data received to reduce





Figure 5. Lawson's C I Process Model
The ANALYZE function is a key step in this process. The reduced possibilities are
transformed into h.ypotheses. These hypotheses are used as the basis to elaborate plans.
A better understanding of this function can be obtained through the Combat Operation
Process M.Ivodel developed in the next section.
Finall), the DISSE.MINATE function distributes the data transformed in intelli-
gence to e ery unit in the chain of command. This intelligence could aflct the decision
adopted, and in such a case could modify that decision.
Lawson emphasizes that projecdons (indicated by the Delta T bl^ck) should not be
used by the 0 process except as part of the DECISION process. The reason for this is
his fear of creating unstable systems. [Ref. 16: pp. 23-43]
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Looking at lines between blocks reveals that this is a feedback process. As was said
before, this is a dynanic-closed loop, where the final outcome of a function, through the
environment, affects the entire process, thus creating a new situation that affiects the
SENSE, PROCESS, and DECIDE functions. The PROCESS function provides lor
eriror reduction --the difference between the real situation with the desired state-- to
zero, through the f'edback action.
C. COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS MODIEL
Figure 6 shows the Combat Operation Process Model. This model is presented by
George Orr in his "Combat Operation C3 I: Fundamentals and Interactions." The fol-
lowing is a briel xplanation of the main characteristics of this model. [Ref. 16: pp.
23-431
LOWER-~E LEVVELSC
Figure 6. Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model
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The Orr model includes the INTELLIGENCE,'ANALYSIS function block with
interfaces to several of the other functions of the process. This function is not very im-
portant at the lower levels where the-direct action affects the environment immediately,
but at higher levels in the hierarchy, the INTELL.IGENCE,'ANALYSIS function begins
to be identified as an individual function. Such is the case in- the Lawson C3 I model
under all conditions. The key items of this function are coverage and timeliness.
The PROCESS function, in this .case, is guided by the
INTELLIGENCEANALYSIS function. Indications from many sensors are gathered
and used to match patterns known to indicate specific situations or events. This func-
tion proN ides the commander with the information that enables him to "see" the battle-
field. The dynanic nature of the battlefield results in a dynamic intelligence perspective.
Then, raw data from sensors plus intelligence and analysis reports are transformed by
the PROCESS fljnction into the-event and status report, which is necessary to the next
step, the DECIDE flunction.
The -INTELL1GENCE;ANALYSIS function includes -two principal activities: the
search or collection of information, and the forecasting of changes in the current situ-
ation. The search or collection of-information concentrates on gathering information
about the enemy from all the sources available. The sources may include tactical, stra-
tegic and national systems 'hich provide human intelligence, electronic and signal in-
telligence and overhead imagery intelligence. These sources will provide information
about the0-organization, structure, capabilities, vulnerabilities-and intention of the enemy
forces. Pre~ious available information about political, economic, social, ethnic and other
non-military matters is also important. The forecasting of-changes in the current situ-
ation is related to the identification of probable courses of action and the determination
of enemy intentions. This activity is critical in the decision making process. The forecast
produced by the PROCESS function is required by the combat commander and staffs
to make-confident decisions based-on the knowledge of terrain, weather and the enemy's
activities -and capabilities.
Th1 -forecasts developed by the INTELLIGENCE,ANALYSIS function orient the
SENSE function by indicating where-to look and what to look for, orient the PROCESS
function-in the deN eloping of patterns for events and situations, and orient the DECIDE
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function by providing an adequate forecast of events and situations and giving-an eval-
uation for possible consequences of proposed actions.
The DECIDE function is, per se, extremely complex. Given the dynamic nature of
war, this difficulty is severely magnified. General Donn A. Starry, U.S.A. (Ret.), a noted
military leader and historian, has described today's decision making process:
The connand and control problem goes something like this: In order to fight the
battle successfully, the commander has to find out what is going on, decide what to
do about it, tell somebody what to do, then keep track of how the battle is going.
He needs to turn that information-decision cycle in time inside the enemy's
information-decision cycle so that, instead of simply reacting to what the -enemy
does, he can seize the initiative. [Ref. 17: p. 7]
There are a number of reasons why the DECIDE function is by far the most-difficult
in the whole process. A fundamental reason is the nature of the problem as stated be-
low:
When the game he (the commander) is playing is continually subject to unpredict-
able change, there is simply no information technology that can be called upon to
cast the commander's problemnin the form of a set of-binary choices.
The crux of the matter is that our conmander must deal with contingencies.
Each contingency is a choice-point, and the possible -paths ahead at any moment
ramify so rapidly that detailed-pre-planning that is adjusted to contingent events is
literally impossible. [Ref. 18: p. 20]
One-reason for the complexity of the DECIDE function, especially for the Army, is
that the land combat, tactical, evaluate-decide process is-far more human-oriented than
any other form of warfare. Decision making is heavily dependent upon information and
knowledge which cannot be quantified or symbolized. Some examples of these factors
are abstract tactical principles such as fire and maneuver, the host of psychological and
physiological intangibles which influence mens' actions on the battlefield and determine
what is possible or not possible in any given situation or instant of -time, the
commander's own intuition of what will succeed or fail, and his stored prior experience
which he brings to bear on the problem. The human mind provides the most effective C2
system found in nature. l-Iuman-psych6logy cannot be ignored in dealing with any deci-
sion making process because every Q system, ultimately, has to interface with theman.
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On the whole, human decision making is remarkably good, showing great-robustness
and flexibility. There is, however, evidence of systematic bias in subjective judgment
which can present significant problems. Proposed automated decision making aids are
sometimes designed to compensate for these systematic biases in human judgment.
On the other hand, there are other aspects which have to be taken into-account on
this subject to complete the description of the decision making process. Over time, the
ability of the intelligence sources to provide data on the progress and status of oper-
ations is increasing rapidly and continues to grow at-an unbounded rate. In conjunction
with these advances in sensor technology, the services are successfully developing sys-
tems-to -perform data correlation-and fusion which transform and reduce the inordi,'Ite
amounts of data into valuable information. This resulting information, however, is still
too voluminous for a human -decision maker to manage. Combine this with the in-
creasingly complex task of managing today's sophisticated Weapon systems, and it is
obvious that the human decision maker is too overwhelmed to make consistently sound
judgments based on this information. Another alternative to consider is that when hu-
man decision makers are put -into a stressful situation and are forced to -make time-
critical- decisions, behavioral -changes can result. They-may not seek optimal solutions to
C2 problems. [Ref. 19: p. 44]
The last block to consider is the ACT function. The main characteristic of this
function is that it interfaces with the environment to bring the situation to -the desired
state. The commander or decision maker triggers the-action, and the means-used are the
aailable forces. In fact, the general model applies also to political, economic, industrial,
etc., situations in which the system interacts with the-environment in order to control it.
D. 0 FUNCTIONAL TASKS
C1 has two general requirements --information- and action. Information-is -necessary
for planning and formulation of conmand decisions and monitoring the execution of
directixes; action occurs in issuing and implementing directives [Ref. 4: p. 20]. JCS
memorandum 3-82 [Ref. 20] outlines the functional- tasks for the C systems supporting
U.S. forces to accomplish these requirements. The -functional tasks are listed below.
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They can have some strategic flavor, but it is convenient to say that they apply equally
to theater and to tactical levels :
1. Monitoring the situation
The 0 system will monitor the current situation, including the status of U.S.
and non-U.S. forces. This is the process of sensing critical information concerning the
political, economic, and military situation on a worldwide basis. The process requires
all-source information collection and processing So recognize unique events and to
identiCy changes in the status of U.S. and non-U.S. force capabilities in the politico-
economic environment.
2. Formulating responses
The formulating responses task includes warning and threat assessment. This
task also comprises evaluation of enemy intentions, current enem3 capability to carry
out intentions, and the selection, adaptation, or formulation of plans responsix e to the
specific situation.
3. Selecting Options, Employing Forces, and Executing Operation Plans.
For deterrence, this is the process of perceiving the pattern of enemy response
to U.S. activity and assessing the impact of U.S. activity on the enemy posture and ca-
pability to initiate hostilities. For force employment to control escalation, the process
includes selecting appropriate responses, implementing operation plans, perceiving the
changes in patterns of enemy response to U.S. activity and assessing the impact and ef-
fectiveness of U.S. activity in terms of the enemy response. For force employment in
response to hostilities, the process includes determining and directing U.S. force activ-
ities in response to tactical warning and recommending an appropriate response based
on attack assessment.
4. Performing assessments
The performance of attack assessment includes the process of deriving projected
attack patterns and impact points from sensed attack events to determine the character
and expected effectiveness of an attack. The performance of strike, damage, and residual
capability assessment includes the process of acquiring strike and damage reports, cor-
relating them to provide a perception of the extent of damage to friendly, and enemy
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forces, and evaluating the impact of damage upon enem and friendly force residual ca-
pabilities and resources.
5. Reconstituting forces
This process includes acting on status repoits concerning the location, condi-
tion, and availability of military resources after attack. The process includes reviewing
the progress of directed actihities and planning subsequent force empjoyment options
based on damage assessment and residual capabilities.
6. Terminating actions
This is the process of perceiving a willingness on the part of the enemy to ne-
gotiate termination of hostilities, projecting the results of current U.S. and enemy act-
ity, and assessing enemy intent and residual capability. The process includes de eloping
plans for reco er% and redeployment to deter renewed conflict and monitoring the
achieN ement of the directed recoN ery posture to insure that the conflict terminates under
conditions favorable to the U.S.
E. FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA
To achieve these functional tasks, military Q systems need to meet the following
criteria[Refl 1: p. 20]:
1. Interoperability
Systems, units, or forces must be able to provide service to and accept from
other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged. [Ref. 21: p. 1S2]
Because of the need to operate with other services and allies, inter perabilit) is a major
issue. This inN olxes questions of standards, comrunonality, compatibility and interfaces.
[Ref. 22: p. 771
2. Survivability
In a battlefield environment, systems fail for a variety of causes. Equipment can
be damaged by fire, dirt and dust. Circuit boards and wires can be corroded because of
rain or salt spray. Connections can be separated by extreme cold or heat, or ibrations
or shock. It is indeed a Ner3 rough environment for electronic material. In order to
survive the enxironment just described, both command centeis and tile communications
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that link one with another and with the operating forces must take some preventive
measures: dispersal of key facilities, mobility, hardening against enemy weapons effec-
tiveness, and redundancy of key facilities, communications, and information data bases.
[Ref. 23: p. IS1]
3. Reliability
A system should do what it is designed to do all or a very high percentage of the
time. This is achieved by designing and acquiring equipment with low failure rates, em-
ploying error correcting techniques, maintaining redundant resources for ke s stem
components, establishing alternate communication routing, and eliminating sources of
human faigue.
4. Flexibility
To meet the challenges of changing situations- and diversified operations with a
minimum of disruption and delay, 0 systems must be designed to be easil) changed and
reconfigured. [Ref. 24: p. 11]
5. User-orientation
Information must be readily accessible in a form usable by the commander and
his staff. Displays, graphics and- decision aids should not require extensive analytical in-
terpretation. [Ref 1: p. 22]
F. SUMMARY
This chapter is designed to describe the combat models developed for executing the
command and control of engaged military forces. Through the PROCESS, COMPAR-
ISON and ANALYSIS functions, the loop is completed to obtain a real picture of the
situation and orient the functions in order to optimize the commander's Niew of the
battlefield. The INTELLIGENCE:ANALYSIS function is highlighted in the Combat
Operations Process Model. This function acts like a guide in orienting the rest of the
functions in the always-changing environment of war. DECIDING is the most complex
of all the functions. Its complexity is based on the human nature of the involved ele-
ments of this function. Decision making aids are used to help in this function, -but it is
the commander who imposes his style in using these aids. Finally, the C' functional tasks
were listed --as stated by JCS-- in order to accomplish both the informdtion and action
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Controlling and optimizing today's advancements in information management
technology is critical to achieving a true operational balance in any army. An appropri-
ate handling of information by users allows the army to perform its functions better.
Providing fire direction data from forward observers to artillery battery fire direction
centers or ensuring the timely alert of short range air defense gunners to improve their
probability of successfully engaging a target are two examples of how suitable informa-
tion management impacts on the development of nilitary actions.
The overall information management goal is to design, build and field C0 systems
and to support systems so that the army can operate the same way in peacetime as
during war. To achieve the optimal development of a C3 information system, it is nec-
essary to give a reference frame from which to work. This reference frame is usually
called an information architecture, and-this concept is extended in the following sections.
Most authors of this subject utilize the term C0 architecture instead of C architecture.
Therefore, for a more convenient understanding, the terminology C architecture will be
used in this chapter. This also applies to C1 system instead of CS system.
B. THE INFORMATION SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The information system architecture defines the relationship of all elements inN olved
in inflormation management and provides a blueprint for planning, developing and exe-
cuting initiatives to enhance battle management. The architecture at each level blends
together the information requirements of the tactical, theater, strategic and sustaining
bases arenas. The architecture provides a basis for identifying, validating and placing in
order of priority the information requirements to facilitate a systematic approach for
acquiring future resources, while precluding development of unnecessary or redundant
information systems and encouraging sharing of the information resources. [Ref. 25: p.
121
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One of the main challenges in the development of this architecture is how to move
from traditionally separated telecommunications systems (information transfer) and
computer (information process) systems cultures to a modern information oriented s s-
tern. To deal with this problem, the new emphasis is on the establishment of an infor-
mation sstem architecture that u ill accommodate the growing Nolume of information
processing and transfer needs, yet ensure compatibilit), interoperabilit , speed and se-
curit3 in command and control. The architecture is intended to accommodate the ad-
ministrati;e and management functions of the users while providing rapid and
expandable information transfer for Army mission,. [Ref. 26: p. 1951 The Information
S stem Architectuie offers the appropriate frame for the development of a C' architec-
ture, which is examined in the next section.
C. Q ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of a C3 system is the initial stage of an o ;erall system engineering
process. As the highest le els ii the national leadership increasingly tend to reach down
through the hierarchical military structure to control forces -- sometimes focusing deeply
in a small area, particularly in crisis situations management-- it can be said that the
process is described as one C layer supported by la.. on layer of C subsystems.
LTGen. John Cushman, U.S.A. (Ret.), a broadly experienced commander and a spe-
cialist in C , states that an organization's C is a subset of the C of the superior military
organization to which it belongs. [Ref. 27: p. 21]
The C architecture can be defined as the arrangement of (or process of arranging)
the basic elements of C into an orderly system framework. The singular characteristic
of a C' architecture is that it describes -the interrelationships between selected elements
of command and control. The conuand and control elements considered in this case are
Functions, facilities, equipment, communications, procedures and personnel. The C" ar-
chitecture- uill be expressed as a set of assumptions, statements anId diagrams describing
the interoperation among the elements of C'. [Ref. 28: p. 81]
The former Deputy Under Secretary of DePense flor Command, Control, Communi-
cation and Intelligence, Don Latham,. -txressed his point of view about C3 architecture
in the following way:
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Difl'brent people have different views of what architecture really is .. Too often,
people look at C" I as a parts list rather thani being able to articulate it into somec
sort of a firamework. When I start talking about program A, B, C and D, 1 try to
develop a framework on which to hiang systems A, 1), C and D. This is really where
you need architecture, that is, thc system approach or system framework. [Ref. 29:
p. 71
figure 7 illustrates the comparison bctmceni the ilitary information system and the
C system. TIhis figure shows the overlap between the two ystcnis at the highest le~ els
of decision making. The C' system ernplo~s the information that the commander and his
staff need to make decisions accurately and on time. The information system architec-
ture and the C' informiation system arcliA; ectuLre must reflect this condition.
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Figure 7. Comparison of Military Iiifqrmnation System to C2 System
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D. TACTICAL 0 ARCHITECTURE
This section describes briefly the 0 architecture adopted by the U.S. Army, flocusing
on the system in the tactical arena. To modernize information management, the U.S.
Army has redefined and readdressed its information systems at all levels. Figure 8 on
page 32 illustrates the SIGMA star, which represents the Army's fihe basic functional
areas: maneuver (MVR), fire support (FS), air defense artillery (ADA),
intelligence,'electronic warfare (IEW), and combat service support (CSS). These proc-
esses are automated or manual, and they are designed to support the internal technical
mission of the battlefield functional areas. The s~steins are the combination of trans-
mission and processing systems. I lowever, some of them appear as pure transmission
or pure processing systems.[Rcf. 30: p. 205]
MCS
Figure 8. Army Tactical Commianid and Control System (ATCCS)
All of" the battlefield conm,:,id umd control activities can be associated with the
particular functional segments mentioned abos e. The follo~~ing is the description of eachi
functional segment given in the Ninth Annual Symposium of AICEA. IRef. 29 : p. 7J
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1. Maneuver Control
The maneuver contiol area comprises the facilities employed to plan, direct,
coordinate and supervise the combat activities of a combined arms force as it closes with
and destroys the enemy by use of fire and maneuver. This includes the command, control
and coordination of combat, combat support and combat service support elements of
the forces in accordance with the commnander's scheme of maneuver.
2. Fire Support
The fire support area comprises the facilities employed for command, control
4nd coordination of activities related to surface target development and the weapon
systems and munitions available to engage those targets in order to suppress, neutralize
or destroy them in support of the force commander.
3. Intelligence/Electronic Warfare
The intelligence electronic warfare area comprises the facilities employed for
* conunand, control and coordination of activities related to intelligence collection, com-
bat information development, operations security and electronic warfare.
4. Air Defense
The air defense area comprises the facilities employed for command, control and
coordination of Army activities related to air defense management and the weapon sxs-
terns and munition available to destroy airborne targets in support of the force
commander.
5. Combat Service Support
the combat service support area comprises the facilities employed for the com-
mand, control and coordination of the activities related to logistical support, personnel
administration and soldier support axailable for the execution of those functions in
support of the force commander.
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E. SYSTEM TYPES
Three Forms of tactical conununications systems are required to support the Arm 's
tactical command-control sistcms as illusrated in FiguIC 9 on page 34. [Ref. 30: p. 205]




Figure 9. Comnmunication/Data Distribution for 0
1. Army Data Distribution Systems
This class of communication system includes the special system designed pri-
marily to accoimnodate the near real-time transmission of data, record and graphics
traffic. [Ref 30: p. 205] These systems meet the high speed data requirement for low
volume data to provide quick sensor-to-shooter reaction time. [Ref. 25: p. 12]
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2. Multichannel Area Systems
The multichannel, circuit-switched area communication systems are required
throughout the area of operations to accomnodate high volumes of traffic in all nodes
(i.e., voice, record, data and facsinile). The area systems provides the primary means of
secure communication at all echelons behind battalion. This multichannel system is
evolving from analog to digital technology. This system is also referred to as Area
Common User and provides broad area coverage for commanders and staffs. [Ref. 25:
p. 2051
3. Single Radio Channel System
This class of communication system includes the HF, VHF, and UI-IF combat
net radio systems, UIF and El-IF single channel tactical satellite systems, and the dedi-
cated data link used to satisfy special purpose communications or data distribution re-
quirements. Although used at all tactical echelons of the U.S. Army, this class of
communications system represents the primary communication mode at battalion level
and higher.
It should be mentioned that voice communications are still needed on the bat-
tlefield, Most commanders derive important situational clues by listening to how their
subordinates sound in their verbal reports.
F. THE AIR-LAND BATTLE AND 0
At this point, it is appropriate to briefly develop the concept of the AIR-LAND
BATTLE. This is actually the official doctrine of the U.S. Army, and the reason for in-
troducing this concept here is the fact that 0 architecture is evolving in accordance with
this doctrine's principles. This doctrine imposes on the future battlefield command and
control new methods for treating one of the most valuable and perishable assets of any
army: information.
Over the last few years, the need for the U.S. Army to develop new battlefield con-
cepts capable of meeting the threat posed by its enemies has led to a major revision in
military doctrine. This doctrine would allow the U.S. to win tactically by incorporating
the greatest technological strength of the U.S. industrial base: the use of information.
[Ref. 31: p. 231] The Air Land Battle is fought by what is called theater forces. It means
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that the land and tactical air forces are those M ich would fight the Air Land Battle in
a land mass theater. Figure 10 on page 36 shows this structure. Ilkef. 17: pp.3-25]
~ COMPA~WKS At irLos~ fieASO MII AkSupoT OEUoioCee
Fiur 10.AIE Air Land Biatln Systemce
upon ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~0 asO an arm corpsrt wihissbriOtpnt ia~do h ateionds~
Center
its~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~TC -conpn ju atclar tec cmie rsehln-fom cor to comn y,
and ex en below- the Air Land Battle s,, stein is a nix of' Functional systems or subs s-
tems as shown in Figzure I I on page 37. [Ref. 17: pp. 3-251 The way that these subsys-
tenis operate changes with different situations and different commanders. Fightfing
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styles often diffier markerdly, even in the same army,[Ref. 32: pp. 45-51J Therefore, it is










l'igure 11. The Nlux of Functional Systems
TFhe Air Land Battle's most salient feature is maneuver. 'he objective is to concen-
trate or disperse Forces and combat systems more rapidly than the enemy can react and
thereby create opportunities to seize the initiative and to destroy the enemy's ability and
will to fight. The concept enmisions syinchronized but decentralized battle execution by
relatively small, self-sullicient units which blend intelligence, firepower and moemnent
into continuous operations to see and stiike to the critical depths of enemy formations.
[Ref. 33: p. 31]
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The C system operates in the Air Land Battle environment in conditions often
approaching chaos. An armed and thinking enem3 is using all his means with all the skill
he can muster to defeat the commander's forces. The skills and leadership of
commanders and the quality of staffs are usually decisive in such situations. Good
commanders try to simplify and to reduce the load of their communications by cutting
down on message traffic, that is, by reducing the number of words sent over comnuni-
cations netm orks. Commanders, among other things, will try to achieve the following:
0 A common perception of the situation
* A common understanding of the mission
* A connon understanding of how to operate
* Teamwork through experience [Ref. 34: pp. 3-251
The principles impose on C systems particular characteristics. Implicit in the Air
Land Battle concept is the need for mobile networks, a communication resource of high
reliability and survivability in the face of hostile enemy action.
G. BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Tactical command and control is e olving into a single integrated battlefield infor-
mation system with four primary functions: information transport, information man-
agement, information collection and information denial. For information transport, the
Army must integrate N oice, graphics and imagery within the information s) stem on the
battlefield so that scarce communications resources can be used wisely. As the technol-
ogy is ex ol ing from ,oice to data transmissions, it is necessary to take advantage of the
package technology. One of the key characteristics of information management will be
the existence of distributed networks overlaid on the information transport system. in-
formation collection s3stems consist of sensor and data processors that provide inte-
grated intelligene and real time targeting information. In the information denial area,




This chapter is designed to describe the concepts of the combat information system
architecture. The establishing of this architecture is essential to the development of C,
systems. It gives the reference frame for any particular project in the information system
area. The tactical information system architecture is designed to support the battle
functions in five major areas: fire support, maneuver control, air defense artillery,
intelligence,'electronic warfare, and combat service support. rinally, it was pointed out
that tactical command and control systems are evolying towards integrated information
systems.
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VI. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE ARGENTINE ARMY
A. INTRODUCTION
So far, the main concepts of C and 0 have been explained, particularly their defi-
nitions, processes and architectures. But now, the viewpoint will be concerned with the
first steps to establish such concepts by the Argentine Army in the C arena. A general
description of the actual state of the Argentine Army C Project will be presented in this
chapter, and some guidelines and comments will be given about its possible evolution.
As part of this introduction, a few words are necessary to pre~ent the reader from mis-
interpreting certain events that occurred in Argentina during the last years. A good de-
scription of these realities is given b3 a group of naval and military Argentine officers in
an article published in Proceedings (March 1989) as follows:
Most of the world has not fully understood what Argentina suffered in the recent
past. The republic faced a strongly ideological terrorist aggression ... The nation
returned to democratic rule in 1983. The 1982 conflict with Britain for control of the
.Malhinas (Falklands) Islands disturbed the foundation of Argentina's relations with
the Western alliances. Indeed, although its culture and history place the nation
unquestionably in the Westcrn world, the troubles of the last years haxe progres-
sively isolated Argentina from Western foreign policy .... Now that is changing.
Argentina has been emerging from its isolation, attempting to match its interests
with the global interests of the West and to demonstrate that its foreign policy is
rational and predictable. It is imperative that these efforts succeed, for Argentia
occupies a vital location in the strategically important South Atlantic .... [Ref. 55:
p. 59]
The Argentine Army (AA) was deeply involved in Argentine national political ac-
tivities from 1976 to 1983, and meanwhile it fought in Argentine interior and foreign
conflicts mentioned above [Ref. 36: pp. 28-39]. After those turbulent years, the
Argentine Army is evaluating its doctrine, capabilities and vulnerabilities in order to be
able to accomplish the mission imposed by the Constitution of the Argentine Republic.
One of the areas where the Argentine Army is most concerned is 0 systems. Past ex-
perience has demonstrated some inadequacies in the proper management of battle and
crisis situations. In the excellent book Operaciones Terrestres en las Malvinas, written
by officers who participated in the campaign, Colonel F. Aguiar (Argentine Arm3),
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Colonel F. Cervo (A.A.), Colonel F. Machinandiarena (A.A.), Colonel E. Dalton (:\.A.)
and Colonel M. Balza (A.A.), objectively described the battle for Puerto Argentino (Port
Stanley) and arrive at the following conclusions:
The knowledge of the situation was always fragmentary and insufficient; it made
difficult the right and timely adoption of resolutions by the Tactical Command op-
crating in Puerto Argentino.[Ref. 37: p. 183]
Another part of the book highlights the good performance of other elements where
command and control worked properly:
The centralization of the field artillery units at high levels of battle management
made possible the execution, coordination and control of fire support during the
development of actions .... .The communication troops, in spite of limited re-
sources, linked command and units, installed fire support networks, and held links
with continental Argentina permanentlY.f Ref. 37: p. 189]
Several measures were taken by the highest authorities of the A.A. in the last few
years in order to develop CI doctrine subject to limitations imposed by budgetar con-
siderations. The following sections describe the current state of these developments.
B. BACKGROUND
The general concept of command and control is implicit in the Argentine Army's
doctrine, but it is not an explicit doctrinal issue within the army. Said another way, the
words "conmnand and control" have begun to appear in Argentine military literature
recently. but concepts and principles are still not incorporated in the doctrine.
The different problems introduced above obligate the military to concentrate its ef-
forts in many areas besides its primary function. For this reason, command and control
has not evolved in the Argentine Army in the same way it has elsewhere.
The last important Argentine Army's doctrinal update took place in the middle
1960s when the exelient relationship between Argentina and United States made possible
a good exchange of information, particularly in organizational and procedural subjects.
After those events, Argentina in general, and the Argentine Army in particular, suffered
from isolation from the rest of the western nations.
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Conmiand and control processes and command, control and communications sys-
tems have not been recognized entities in the Argentine Arm3 in the same manner as
they are in the U.S. Army. For this reason, it is very difficult to identify the real prob-
lems that the Argentine Army has in its command and control process.
The Argentine Army is currently involved in an in-depth review of its warfighting
policies and procedures. This provides an ideal opportunity to incorporate the concepts
of command and control into army doctrine. To do that, the 0 process should be care-
fully studied and adapted to the unique requirements of the Argentine Army. Such a
study wiould ha~e to center around the command and control process itself. KnowNledge
of the process is fundamental for further development of a commnad, control, and
communications architecture.
The Argentine Army Chief of Staff ordered a study about 0 aspects in 1989. Among
the documents used to regulate command and control actixities within the Army up to
that moment were the following:
* The manual "Organization and Functioning of the Staffs" contains current doc-
trinal issues in its chapter named "Operations Control."
* The report and proposal worked out by the Special Studies Team (0) in 1987.
* Directive of the Chief of Army General Staff 726,189 (Development of the 0I
Project) dated 11 May 1989.
* Report about defining the mission, functions and capabilities of the C I system
written by the C1 Department,' Planning Direction in conjunction with the
J3-Operations in June 89.
* Information about Narious foreign C system developments, in particular the RITA
from France, CATRIN from Italy, EPLRS and ATCCS from U.S.A.
With the documents mentioned above as background, the recently created C De-
partment of the Argentine Army Staff made two major reports about the characteristics
of a possible C architecture for the Army: the C1 System Study and the C Command
Center Study. Both studies will be described briefly.
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1. Q SYSTEM STUDY
The C System Study established the operational requirements considered nec-
essary for the Argentine Army C architecture. They were the folowing: [Ref. 38: pp.
5-17]
* Provide warning about enemy attacks and describe magnitude and type.
* Provide permanent evaluation of the current situation of own forces.
* Collect information about the potential enemy threat in order to formulate analysis
and evaluation of the current situation.
* Assist planning support and decision making process.
c Transmit orders and control the mission execution.
* Coordinate actions in time and space.
* Protect and secure the stored and transmitted information.
In order to satisfy the requirements listed above, the C Department proposed
the implementation of four subsystems:
The High Reliability and Survivability Communication Subsystem (COMTAC)
which has the objective of offering fast. secure, and continuous conmunication
support to all the operative units. as far as battalion and company levels, and link
the tactical system with the national and strategic communication system.
The Target Acquisition and Battlefield Surveillance Subsystem (VICATAB) which
has the objective of acquiring land targets, processing the data obtained by the
sensors in the data correlation centers and supporting the field artilery units.
The Air Surveillance, Air Threat Detection, Engagement of Air Defense Artillery
and Tactical Army Aviation Subsystem (VIAER) which has the objective of' gath-
ering, evaluating and presenting information about enemy air activities, exaluating
threats, and assigning targets to fire units.
"The' Information Processing and Decision Making Support Subsystem (PROIN)
which has the objecti, of gathering, evaluating and presenting information about
the status of both own and enemy forces.
2. C COMMAND CENTER STUDY
T1 € ^ t " /- . 3 1- ,, .
Te %- Comand Center Study a carried out by the C Department to com-
plement the C System Study. This study established the following main capabilities to
be performed by a C command center: [Ref. 39: pp. 7-24]
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1. Gathering, correlating and selecting data depending on its validation.
2. Processing the selected data.
3. Classifying. recording and storing data in the data bases.
4. Providing a wide or narrow selection of the interest zone of the battlefield.
5. Pro'iding automatic and timcl signaling when changes in the situation have oc-
curred.
6. Providing a staff report selection to be presented to the commander.
7. Generating orders, information and intelligence to subordinate units.
8. Maintaining the alert state.
The capabilities that this C command center would be able to supply to the
different elements of the staff are listed in this study. Among the elements supported by
the C' Center are as follows:






7. Fire Support Coordinator
8. Engineering Officer
9. Communication and Electronic Warfare Officer
10. Air Defense Element
11. Army Aviation Element
In conclusion, this study points out that the availability of all the above ele-
ments Aill optimize the performance of the land forces and thus increase their capabili-
ties to achieve the objectives imposed by national authorities.The ultimate goal of the C3
Commnad Center is to present a picture of the situation to the strategic or tactical
commander, or to the national authorities when required. The C Commad Center will
be especially useful in crisis situations when a close monitoring of a particular situation
is required.
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C. THE MERGER OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS
Another factor contributing to further development of 0 systems concepts is the
gradual automation of communications systems. The Argentine Army recognizes that
the traditional separation of information processing and information transfer is becom-
ing less distinct. These two different "worlds" which have been separated for years, now
are coming together. The traditionally separated Directorate of the Automated Data
Computation System (DISCAD) is now a part of the Directorate of Communication.
It means to collocate the data processing function and the transmission function under
a single command. Furthermore, the Department of 0 has been put under the same
Directorate of Communication.
D. THE TARGET INFORMATION SYSTEM
At the present, time the Argentine Army has a considerable investment in computer
and communications equipment that has been procured and installed without regard to
system integration or interoperability. The growth of these systems did not follow a
centralized policy. Instead, they were installed to meet the inmediate needs of the users
without regard to operational impact. The SIIFE Project (Sistema Informatico
Integrado de la Fuerza Ejercio) was the first attempt to organize information processing
in the A.A.. Because of changes in priorities with subsequent budget cuts, this project
did not reach its original objectives, and the proposed integration stopped at the level
of the Army Staff and its formations, thus omitting the corps, brigades and units.
In 1987, the DISCAD began another project (Project 10) in an attempt to continue
the original SIIFE project. The target users in that case were one brigade and its sub-
ordinate units. The objective of that project was to implement systems to support lo-
gistical functions. Initially those systems were isolated. Later they were integrated into
the SIIFE system. Besides these initiatives, many individual initiatives have surged re-
cently, so the A.A. has actually hundreds of stand-alone systems in use in battalions,
companies and squadrons.
The merging of communications and computers, the efforts made in integrating the
Army Information System, and the studies performed by the C Department of the Army,
Staff are good initial steps in the direction of effective C. To achieve good performance
45
in command and control actiN ities. the Argentine Army has to integrate the concepts of
C2 into its current doctrine, and then start developing the 0 architecture.
One parallel dexelopment is fundamental. The Argentine Army should establish an
Army system architecture in order to establish a baseline for further developments. One
practical approach to unify these efforts is for the Army to maximize the use of existing
assets while it establishes an objective Master Information System Architecture. To do
that, the Army information authority will have to carry out the following actions:
1. De elop an overview of current information s~ stem resources, and their structure
and relationship to all external systems.
2. Analyze current capabilities of the available systems and determine inadequacies.
3. Make a listing of all requirements presented by the potential users.
4. Propose a recommended architecture, the alternatives and the preferred choice.
5. Establish a methodology for the integration of C2 , teleconununications and MIS
programs into a ccmprehensive architecture.
6. De elop a description of the present and future architecture in order to track the
transition from the baseline to a fully integrated, operational architecture.
7. Define necessary program and projects within the architecture.
8. Fund requirements.
Once the architecture is defined and approved and the C" process is studied and
adopted in the current doctrine, the 0 authority should issue the guidance for the de-
velopment of 0 systems.The following considerations are necessary:
* Satisfaction of operational requirements
* Mobility of equipment
* Joint development efforts
* Intra,'inter operability
* Standardization and commonality
e Simplicity of operation
* Integrated logistic support planning
• Transition to extensive, common user, secure, digital communications
* Effects of electronic warfare
46
E. SUMMARY
The first steps have becn taken in the direction of designing the appropriate C0 sys-
tems that fit the Argentine Army. The adoption of a 0 process within army doctrine
is still pending as is the development of an appropriated information architecture that
is tailored to the Argentine Army's requirements. It has to be a coordinated effort be-
tween all branches within the army.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The design of a C architecture is an ambitious enterprise. This thesis only presented
some ideas, processes, examples, models and suggestions for use in developing such a 0
system, many of which arc applicable for the Argentine Army C project.
This thesis has been written with the objectixe of helping the Argentine Army in its
efforts to design a C system through the presentation of the basic concepts of C proc-
ess, C system and C architecture. This thesis has introduced the main ideas that the
author, as an officer of the Argentine Arm who is knowledgeable of the particular
constraints and resuictions facing his army, has considered useful to in estigate in this
initial phase of development of C concepts within the Argentine Army.
On occasion, and especially in times of changing technology and strategic problem
situations, there are periods of considerable doctrinal ferment. Such a case is the
Argentine Army doctrine, u hikh is being revised and implemented. This thesis, through
the inlitI.sion of the C process and C3 system characteristics, adds more elements of in-
terest to be taken into account in the doctrinal update of Argentine Army.
48
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Martin, Terry L., Command, Control and Communications Mission and Organization:
A Primer, M. S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 1984.
2. Kenny, P. J., "Army Command, Control and Communications System Planning,"
Signal,July 1978.
3. Adams, Lawrence E., "The Evolving Role of C3 in Crisis Management," Signal,
August 1975.
4. Conley, Robert E., "Military C'," Selected Analytical Concepts in Command and
Control, Gordon and Breach, New York, 1982.
5. Moll, Kenneth L., "The C0 Functions," Selected Analytical Concepts in Command
and Control, Gordon and Breach, New York, 1982.
6. Virden, F., "Cornunication Requirements of our Navy," Signal, December 1975.
7. Daugherty, M. "SAC C' ," Signal, March 1975.
8. Dineen, G. P., "C' I an Overview," Signal, November/December 1978.
9. Armed Forces Connunications-Electronics Association (AFCEA), "Command and
Control (C) System Acquisition Study, Command, Control, and Communications
System," Defense Science and Electronics, January 1983.
10. Capone, Jr., Lucien, "Command, Control, Communications: C Challenges in the
1980s," Signal, November 1980.
11. Lawson, Jr., Joel S., "The State Variables of a Command and Control System,"
Selected Analytical Concepts in Command and Control, Gordon and Breanch, New
York. 1982.
49
12. Guralnik, David B., WJ'ebster New ivWorld Dictionay, July 1983.
13. Lawson, Jr., Joel S., "Naval Tactical C Architecture 1985-1995," Signal, August
1979.
14. Herres, Robert T., "Equipment, Personnel and Procedures- Foundations for Future
C' Architecture," Principles of Command and Control, AFCEA International Press,
Washington D.C.,1985.
15. Baker, M. R. and Miller, H. S., "Command and Control Evaluation Effort, Vol
11," A Command and Control Evaluation Methodology Concept, the MITRE Cor-
poration, August 1981.
16. Orr, George E., Combat Operations C I: Fundamentals and Interactions, Air Uni-
versity Press, Alabama, July 1983.
17. Cushman, John H., "How a Field Commander Looks at Aids to Decision
Making," Tools for the Decisioninaker Conference, Rome Air Development Center
pamphlet, September 22-24, 1981.
18. Shore, D., "Trend in Command and Control," Signal, October 1974.
19. Wanner, Eleanor; Steigewald, Robert: Clark, Delores, "The Application of Decision
Aid Technology to Cormnand and Control," Signal, March 1984.
20. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 3-82, Policy and Procedures for Management of
Joint Command and Control Systemns, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1982.
21. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), Publication 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 June 1979.
22. Diamond, 'red I., "A Structure for Tactical C1 ," Signal, August 1979.
23. Morris, Derek S., "Command and Control Systems of the 21st Century," Speech
presented at the Eighth Annual Symposium of the AFCEA's Fort Monmouth
50
Chapter on September 27-28, 1983, Tactical C3 for the Ground Forces, AFCEA
International Press, Washington D.C., 1985.
24. Shook, Clyde M.. "Tactical 0 Systems and Methodology for Functional Decom-
position," Signal, March 1981.
25. Doyle, David K., Kawka, Richard, Britary, Ronnie G., "o : The Army's Looking
Glass, Army Information Systems," Signal, May 1985.
26. Glass, William, "Army Information Systems," Signal, May 1985.
27. Rockwell, James A., Tactical C for the Ground Forces, AFCEA International Press,
Washington D.C., 1985.
28. Monteleon, Victor J.; Miller, James R., "Another Look at QArchitecture," Signal,
May 1988.
29. I-lallonsworth, John A.; Boyes, Jon L.; Lamar, Kirby, "Improving the Tactical CI
Situation - Can We Do It?," Signal, November 1981.
30. Diedriclisen, Loren D., "Evolution and Integration of Army Tactical C, Systems,"
Tactical 0 for the Ground Forces, AFCEA International Press, 1985.
31. Dworkin, Larry U., "Distributed C Evolution (1980-2020)," Tactical C for the
Ground Forces, AFCEA International Press, 1985.
32. Cushman, John H., "Air Land Battle Mastery and C Systems for the Multinational
Field Commander," Signal, March 1983.
33. Murfin, Robert, "Intelligence and Communications: Keys to Air Land Battle
2000," Signal, October 1983.
4i 34. Cushman, John, "The Nature of Theater Forces and of their Command and Con-
trol," Command and Control of Thehter Forces: Adequacy , AFCEA International
Press, 1985.
51
35. Stella, Joaquin, "Stabilizing the Uneasy South Atlantic," Higher Strategy Course
of Argentine Naval War School, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, March
1989.
36. Terrorism in Argentina, Collection of Periodicals Published since 1970-1978, Sud
Americana, Buenos Aires, 1979.
37. Aguiar, F.; Cervo F.; Machinandiarena, F.; Baiza, M.; Dalton, E.; "Operaciones
Terrestres en las Islas Malvinas", Circulo Aiilitar, Buenos Aires, 1985.
38. Department C 1, Directorate of Planning, Argentine Army General Staff, Estudio
de Estado Mayor Sistema de Cornando y Control para las Tropas del Ejercito,
Buenos Aires , September 1989.
39. Department Q 1, Directorate of Planning, Argentine Army General Staff, Estudio





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002




4. Escuela Superior Tecnica 2
Cabildo 15
Buenos Aires. Argentina
53
